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Abstract
Evolutionary games on networks traditionally assume that each individual adopts an identical strategy
to interact with all its neighbors in each generation. Considering the prevalent diversity of individual
interactions in the real society, herewe propose the concept of interactive diversity, which allows
individuals to adopt different strategies against different neighbors in each generation.We investigate
the evolution of cooperation based on the edge dynamics rather than the traditional nodal dynamics
in networked systems. The results show that, without invoking any othermechanisms, interactive
diversity drives the frequency of cooperation to a high level for a wide range of parameters in both
well-mixed and structured populations. Even in highly connected populations, cooperation still
thrives.When interactive diversity and large topological heterogeneity are combined together,
however, in the relaxed social dilemma, cooperation level is lower than that with just one of them,
implying that the combination ofmany promotive factorsmaymake aworse outcome. By an
analytical approximation, we get the condition underwhich interactive diversity providesmore
advantages for cooperation than traditional evolutionary dynamics does. Numerical simulations
validating the approximation are also presented. Ourwork provides a new line to explore the latent
relation between the ubiquitous cooperation and individuals’ distinct responses in different
interactions. The presented results suggest that interactive diversity should receivemore attention in
pursuingmechanisms fostering cooperation.
1. Introduction
Understanding the evolution of cooperation is a fundamental problem in socioeconomics and evolutionary
biology [1, 2]. Resorting to the powerfulmathematical framework of evolutionary game theory, researchers have
investedmuch effort in exploring this problem [3–8]. Since the seminal work on spatial games [9], traditional
explorations of the evolution of cooperation on ideal structureless (well-mixed) populations [3–6] aremoved to
structured cases where individuals are constrained to playwith theirﬁrst or second order of neighbors [10–15].
With the discovery of topologies embedded in human interactions in the real society [16–19], many further
investigations have been carried out in various complex networks where nodes indicate individuals and links
represent neighborhoods [20–23]. It is widely accepted that spatial structures promote the evolution of
cooperation in terms of theoretical predictions [23–27], computation simulations [9, 28, 29], and behavioral
experiments [30].
Besides exploring structural complexity [31], researchers set out to consider diversities recently [32–38]. For
example, social diversity deﬁnes a scenario where the investment of each individual per game relies on the
number of its social ties and individuals withmore neighbors contribute less to each game. In particular, when
social ties follow a scale-free distribution, individuals’ investments per game are diverse, which leads to an
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impressive boost of cooperation [34, 35]. Heterogeneous teaching activitymodels a situationwhere the rate of
strategy imitation depends on both payoff difference and individuals’ teaching rates, allowing that individuals
with high teaching rates spread their strategiesmuch faster than others do. The remarkable distinction of
teaching rates enhances cooperation signiﬁcantly [36]. Reacting diversity endows individuals with different rates
to remove unwanted ties, bywhich a few individuals sever dissatisﬁed social ties (that link to defectors) swiftly
while others tolerate neighbors’ defection. The coexistence of different reacting rates promotes cooperation
despite individuals’myopia in their own interests [37]. For a comprehensive review of the diversity, see [38].
Although various diversities receivemuch attention, so far,most researchers have just focused on the
difference of individuals’ social features [38], like the number of social ties [35], teaching rates [36] and reacting
rates [37]. In these studies, each individual treats all its neighbors as equivalent and adopts an identical strategy
against them in each generation [38], which is in stark contrast withmany realistic situations [39–42]. For
example, in epidemic dynamics, individualsmay take distinct interactive strategies against neighbors to protect
themselves fromdiseases, such as keeping the contact with the healthywhile severing links to the infected [39].
In human society, heredity and inheritance endow individuals with distinct properties, like consanguinity,
phenotypes and briefs. These individualsmay live in harmonywith those possessing similar properties while
frequently in conﬂict with the others. A typical example is about parochial altruism that individuals beneﬁt
fellow groupmembers at a cost to themselves and adopt a hostile attitude towards those fromother groups
[40, 41]. Besides, in biological systems, humandiseasemissensemutationsmay cause speciﬁc perturbations in
particularmolecular interactions while leave other interactions undisturbed, which shows the distinct reactions
of proteinmutants in different interactions [42]. Also, one’s emotions, like the sympathy or goodwill to the
inferiors and the envy or spite to the superiors,may lead to its distinct acts towards neighbors in different social
rank, which has been introduced to explore the evolution of cooperation [43, 44]. All the above examples
indicate that individuals’ actions in an interaction usually depend on bothwho they are andwhom they interact
with. Probably, the same individual behaves distinctly in different interactions in one generation.
Taken together, here we interpret the discriminative acts of an individual in different interactions as
interactive diversity. From the perspective of networked systems, we investigate the dynamical effects of
interactive diversity on the evolution of cooperation based on edge dynamics [45] rather than traditional nodal
dynamics explored in other kinds of diversities [35, 37]. Put differently, instead of probing how cooperation
disseminates over nodes, herewe aremore interested in how cooperation spreads fromone edge to another. The
well-mixed and structured populations represented by various complex networks are studied systematically.
The obtained results show that interactive diversity fosters cooperationwithout invoking any other
mechanisms.
2.Model
In a typical symmetric two-person game, two individuals simultaneously decide whether to cooperate (C) or to
defect (D). Depending on their choices, they receive some payoffs, which can be expressed by a general 2×2
payoffmatrix [29].Without loss of generality, we use two parametersT, S to represent the payoffmatrix as
( )
C D
C
D
S
T
1
0
.
With- < <S1 1, < <T0 2, three typical social dilemmas, the Prisoner’s Dilemma [46], the Snowdrift game
[47], and the Stag-hunt game [48], can be captured [49]. In this paper, we study interactive diversity and
cooperation in thesemost used social dilemmas.
Figure 1 shows how interactive diversity is introduced in the structured population. Traditionally, without
interactive diversity, each individual either cooperates or defects to all its neighbors in each generation [29].
While in the presence of interactive diversity, everyone is allowed to adopt cooperation and defection
simultaneously against its different neighbors. As shown inﬁgure 1(b), individual lc cooperates with h1 and
meanwhile defects to h2.
In each generation, each individual plays gameswith all its neighbors with corresponding strategies and
accumulates payoffs from all games that it participates in.When it comes to strategy updating, each individual
only knows its neighbors’ actions towards itself owing to the interactions with these neighbors, while it is not
informed how its neighbors interact with the third party. Therefore each individual would update its strategies
by imitating how its neighbors behave to it. Here we take lc updating the strategy against h2 for example
(ﬁgure 1(b)). First, a neighbor is randomly chosen from lcʼs neighborhood, called h1. The chosen one could be h2,
whichmeans that lc possibly treats h2 in the sameway as h2 does to lc. Next, if lcʼs accumulated payoff Plc is less
than h1ʼs accumulated payoff Ph1, lc imitates h1 (lc replaces its strategy against h2 with h1ʼs strategy against lc)with
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the probability -( ) ( )P P MKh lc1 , where = -{ } { }M T Smax , 1 min , 0 andK is the larger one between lcʼs
and h1ʼs degree.MK ensures the proper normalization of the probability [29]. Otherwise, lc remains its strategy
against h2. lcʼs strategies towards other neighbors are updated in the sameway. In fact, all strategies of an
individual are independent in someways. Thus, it is reasonable for each individual to subsequently update its
strategies independently by randomly choosing a neighbor to imitate, in accordancewith the canonical updating
rule [28, 29, 35]. In this paper, all individuals update their strategies synchronously in the sameway as lc (the
examplementioned above). And asynchronous update, which usually best describes biological and human
processes [31], is also studied for a comparison.
For a comprehensive research, we explore interactive diversity in bothwell-mixed and structured
populations represented by complex networks with different degree of heterogeneity, including regular, random
[50], small world [16], and scale-free networks [17]. To further understand the evolutionary dynamics from the
microscopic perspective, a double-star graphwith common leaves (ﬁgure 1), serving as the simplest abstraction
of heterogeneous network [34, 35, 51], is constructed to show the detailed processes of evolution. The double-
star graph has two centers, a left center h1 with -N 1 leaves and a right center h2 with -M 1 leaves. Among the
leaves of h1, - -N L 1 leaves l1 are solely linked to h1, and L leaves lc are linked to both h1 and h2. Similarly,
- -M L 1 leaves l2 are just linked to h2. In this paper, considering interactive diversity, we quantify the
frequency of cooperation fCwith the average frequency of cooperative strategies [52, 53].
3. Results
ByMonte Carlo simulations, we analyze the dynamics of interactive diversity inwell-mixed and four structured
populations represented by complex networks. Here the small world network is generated in terms of theWatts–
Strogatz algorithm [16]with rewiring probability p=0.1, and the scale-free network is generated via the
mechanisms of growth and preferential attachment [17]. The population size is 200 for thewell-mixed one and
1000 for structured ones with average degree 4. Initially, each individual randomly chooses cooperation or
defection in each interaction, and the population has equal amount of cooperative and defective strategies. The
mean frequency of cooperation is averaged over ´5 103 generations after a transient time of 106 generations,
and the equilibrium average is averaged over 10 simulationswith 20 different realizations for each kind of
network. The obtained results do not change in larger populations orwith asynchronous update rules. Later, by
theoretical analysis andMonte Carlo simulations on a double-star graph, we clearly elucidate the underlying
microscopicmechanisms responsible for the outcomes in complex networks.
3.1. Interactive diversity in complex networks
Let usﬁrst focus on how interactive diversity affects the evolution of cooperation in thewell-mixed population.
In the SHdomain (- < <S1 0, < <T0 1), previous work has demonstrated that in the inﬁnite well-mixed
populationwithout the interactive diversity, the critical value of the initial density of cooperators is
+ -( )S T S 1 abovewhich cooperators dominate while belowwhich defectors take over thewhole population
Figure 1. Illustrations of interactive diversity on a double-star graph. (a)Traditionally, without interactive diversity, each individual is
assumed to adopt an identical strategy against all of its neighbors in each generation. For example, h2 cooperates with all its neighbors
while lc defects. The corresponding individual is called a cooperator (blue) or a defector (red). (b)With interactive diversity,
individuals (green) could adopt cooperative (blue) and defective (red) strategies simultaneously against different neighbors, where the
strategies aremarkedwith smaller cycles. For example, in the speciﬁc interaction happening between lc and h1, lc chooses to cooperate
while h1 defects.Meanwhile, lc adopts a defective strategy to another neighbor h2, bringing an accumulative payoff S+T. In the
presence of interactive diversity, individuals cooperating (defecting) in all interactions are still named as cooperators (defectors), like
h2 (h1).
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[54]. Here, we set the initial cooperator density to be 0.5 (apply to all the simulations inﬁgure 2).When
- > <( )T S 1, + - > <( ) ( )S T S 1 0.5, meaning that under our initial setting cooperators ﬁnally die out
(dominate). However, when interactive diversity is introduced, our results show that it can lead to the emergence
of cooperation evenwhen - >T S 1 (see theﬁrst columnofﬁgure 2), thus indicating that interactive diversity
enlarges the survival ranges of cooperation. Similar results are also found in PDwhere the population inevitably
evolves to full defection in the traditionalmodel.When it comes to the SGdomain, interactive diversity elevates
theﬁnal level of cooperation. An intuitive explanation for these results is that, interacting diverselymakes it
possible for individuals to react to opponents’ cooperative acts with cooperation and defective acts with
defection. It helps tomaintain individuals’ incomes and reduce the exploitation by defectors, whichweakens the
deﬁnite advantage of defectors in thewell-mixed population.Weﬁnd a similar case in previous studies [55]:
individuals with low strategy values and high image scores beneﬁt from theirmutual donationwhile refuse to
contribute to defectors with the highest strategy values and low image scores, which leads to the extinction of
defectors.
Thenwe employ the population structures represented by regular, random, small world, and scale-free
networks. Due to the similar results obtained in the ﬁrst three networks (middle three contours inﬁgure 2(c)),
here we analyze them together.Weﬁnd that, in both the Prisoner’sDilemma and the Stag-hunt game,
cooperation is elevated signiﬁcantly beyond that supported network reciprocity alone.More to the point, the
moderate topological heterogeneity embedded in random and small world networks seems to enhance the
facilitative effects of interactive diversity on the evolution of cooperation.Here we do not stress this point too
much. For these outcomes in the structured populations, the stable cooperative clusters are responsible. Inside
the clusters, individuals preserve high payoffs by theirmutual cooperation.Meanwhile, they defect to defectors
outside to get out of exploitation. Consequently, individuals in the boundary of the clusters resist the invasion of
defectors even in the harsh situationwhere the temptation to defect is sizable.Moreover, we observe the slight
decrease of the cooperation level in SG, and a brief explanation is given below. The payoff structure of SG
determines that it is better for individuals to adopt the opposite strategies of their opponents, which inhabits the
formation of compact clusters of cooperators [53].Meanwhile, since individuals are able to react differently to
different neighbors in ourmodel, the preferred opposite strategy pattern along a link is farmore pervasive than
that in the traditional case. These two together lead to the shrinkage in the level of cooperation.
Further we incorporate large topological heterogeneity in our study. By virtue of the greatest heterogeneity
possessed by scale-free networks, interactive diversity guarantees the largest survival domain of cooperation in
both PD and SH.However, in the relaxed social dilemma, such as the upper-left domain of PD, cooperation and
defection coexist. Such coexistence is in contrast with the domination of cooperators in the traditional setting
[29] aswell as that in structured populationswithout large topological heterogeneity. In otherwords, when the
Figure 2. Interactive diversity favors cooperation in structured populations. For the evolution of cooperationwithout (a) andwith (b)
interactive diversity, the frequency of cooperation fC in the well-mixed population, regular, random, small world, and scale-free
networks are plotted as contours ofT and S. Detailed difference of fC shown in (c) is generated by subtracting those in (a) from those in
(b) correspondingly. In each panel, the upper-right quadrant corresponds to the Snowdrift game (SG,
< < < < + <S T T S0 1 2, 2), the lower-left one to the Stag-Hunt game (SH,- < < < <S T1 0 1), and the lower-right one
to the Prisoner’sDilemma (PD,- < < < <S T1 0, 1 2).
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temptation to defect is small, the combination of interactive diversity and large topological heterogeneity
reversely decreases cooperation level, implying that combiningmany promotive factorsmaymake aworse
outcome [25]. The evolution on the double-star graph later helps tomake thismechanism clear, asﬁgure 5
shows.
Next, we explore interactive diversity in the highly connected populations. Taking the Prisoner’sDilemma as
a typical example, we consider this problemwith rescaled payoffmatrix
-
+( )
C D
C
D
r
r
1
1 0
,
where r denotes the ratio of the cost over the net beneﬁt of cooperation [56].
Figure 3 shows that interactive diversitymaintains cooperation in the highly connected populations
irrespective of population structures. Traditionally, the evolution of cooperation is extremely susceptible to the
average degree. Increasing the number of social tiesmakes cooperators possibly be exploited bymore defectors,
whichweakens the resistance of cooperator clusters to defectors’ invasion. In particular, the approximation to
thewell-mixed limit consistently causes the sharp decline of cooperation [57]. However, in ourmodel,
increasing average degrees towards the fully connected networks does not offer defectors such an advantage to
exploitmore cooperators. Aswe havementioned, individuals inside the clusters reduce the exploitation by
defectors outside, which actually consolidates the clusters [9]. Therefore, considerable cooperative acts remain
in the population.
The results above are obtained in the setting that individuals randomly choose strategies against different
neighbors initially (with random initial strategies) and everyone updates all its strategies synchronously.
Considering that individuals know little about their neighbors in the beginning, instead of treating neighbors
differently, theymay adopt an identical strategy against neighbors initially (with same initial strategies).
Furthermore, we probe how strategy updating proportions p affect the evolution of cooperation. For =p 25%,
each individual is set to update one fourth of its strategies in each generation. The presented results inﬁgure 4
demonstrate that the evolution is robust for strategy updating proportions and individuals’ initial states.
Figure 3. Interactive diversitymaintains cooperation in the highly connected populations.We plot the frequency of cooperation fC as
a function of the average degree kavg for different cost-to-beneﬁt ratios r (0.03, 0.05, 0.10). Four populations structured in regular,
random, small world, and scale-free networks are considered, respectively.
Figure 4.Evolution of cooperationwith different strategy updating proportions under two initial states, say, with random initial
strategies (open symbols) andwith same initial strategies (×). Here the frequency of cooperation fC is plotted as a function of r for four
strategy updating proportions p (25%, 50%, 75%, 100%).
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3.2. Interactive diversity on the double-star graph
By scrutinizing the detailed evolutionary process on the double-star graph, wemake two questions understood:
how cooperative clusters form and expand; why cooperation shrinks in the relaxed situations when interactive
diversity and topological heterogeneity are combined together. The answer for the ﬁrst questionwell explains
the emergence of cooperation in the harsh situations.Here the payoff structure is the same as that inﬁgure 3.
Two situations, the relaxed one for a small r and the harsh one for a large r, are quantitatively analyzed
respectively in the traditional setting (without interactive diversity, see appendix A) and in ourmodel (with
interactive diversity, see appendix B). Inﬁgure 5, in each situation, threemost common evolutionary processes,
including one in the traditional setting and two in ourmodel, are elaborated. The theoretical cooperation level
corresponding to each process is shown in table 1.
We start with the evolution in the relaxed situation. In the traditional setting, defectors on hubs easily
become the victims of their own success due to the dissemination of defection in their neighborhoods, and then
lose the occupation of hubs [35, 58, 59]. Here on the double-star graph, we get a critical cost-to-beneﬁt ratio
= - ( )*r
L
N L
1
belowwhich cooperators easily wipe out all defectors and dominate in the population (A1 A5 inﬁgure 5(a),
see appendix A).
In the presence of interactive diversity, each individual is allowed to adopt cooperation and defection
simultaneously. Especially in the games played by individuals sitting on hubs, cooperation and defection are
observed simultaneously. Indeed, the dissemination of defection causes inevitably losses to them.Nevertheless,
Figure 5.Typical scenarios for the evolution of cooperation on the double-star graph. Two sets of graphs are plotted in two situations,
(a) relaxed (r=0.19) and (b)harsh (r=0.90). In each situation, we consider the evolutionwithout andwith interactive diversity
(ID). Each set of graphs shows themain evolutionary process (dashed box), and analytical stable frequencies of cooperation are shown
in the right side of solid boxes. The results are validated by the simulations (lines in the solid box), and the corresponding states are
marked (open squares in each line). Initially, on the double-star graph, the left center is occupied by a defector and the right center by a
cooperator, separately. Over leaves, defectors and cooperators are distributed equally. The population starts to evolve and ﬁnally
reaches the equilibrium states. The graph size is = = =N M L60, 40, 10.
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by virtue of the natural advantage to participate inmore games and themutual cooperationwith some
neighboring cooperators, individuals on hubs still keep advantages over those on nearby sites. In other words,
defection survives in the population under the shelter of individuals on hubs (B31 B41 in ﬁgure 5(a)).
B32 B52 inﬁgure 5(a) illustrates how an individual on the hub leads to dissemination of defection over its
neighbors. Both two equilibrium values fC
R
1 and fC
R
2 in the table 1 are lower than fC
R, identifying the inhibitive
effects caused by the combination of interactive diversity and large topological heterogeneity.
In the harsh situation, the sizeable temptation to defect and the great loss from exploitationweaken the
viability of cooperators. In the traditional setting, defectors on hubs directly invade their nearby sites, resulting
in the extinction of cooperators (A1 A3 inﬁgure 5(b)).
With interactive diversity, cooperation however emerges. The formation and expand of cooperative clusters
are responsible for this. The former one can be explained through the process B22 B32 inﬁgure 5(b). The latter
one is shown in B21 B51. On the one hand, relying on themutual cooperation inside the clusters and the
resistance to exploitation by defectors outside, individuals in the boundary of the clusters hold their advantages
over individuals outside. These advantagesmake the dissemination of cooperation feasible. On the other hand,
for individuals outside the clusters, in the traditional setting, imitating cooperative behaviorsmeans to be
exploited by all neighboring defectors. However, interactive diversity enables them to imitate cooperative acts
just in some interactions, which reduces the risk to adopt cooperation and facilitates the further spread of
cooperation.
Moreover, the analytical dynamics above (the graph sets in the dashed box and the stable values in the right
side of solid box) is validated by our simulation results (the lines in the solid box ofﬁgure 5) in both relaxed and
harsh situations. Herewe have to note that the steady trapped states shown inﬁgure 5 actually result from the
update rule bywhich individuals only imitate those performing better.When an irrational choice for one to
learn the less successful individuals is allowed, as induced by the application of the Fermi rule, population
escapes from such trapped states. Despite the different equilibriums, both the average frequency of cooperation
and themicroscopicmechanisms responsible for these results still remain consistent.
Inﬁgure 6, we show the cooperation level throughout the entire range of r on double-star grapheswith two
different graph sizes.When individuals interact identically, as r increases, fC is predicted to decrease sharply near
r* since the cooperator suffers from its occupation to a hub and this suffering inhibits the further spread of
cooperation to its neighbors.With interactive diversity, individuals adjust their strategies partly and cooperation
spreads easily even for large r, resulting in the smooth curve of fC. Analytically, r
*well predicts when interactive
diversity providesmore advantages for cooperation than the traditional dynamics does (see appendix B). As
ﬁgure 6 shows, nomatter who occupies the larger center initially, interactive diversity always beneﬁts
cooperation for r above r*.Moreover, the promotion is enhanced further in both relaxed and harsh situations
when a cooperator is located on the larger center in the beginning. Other graph sizes lead to similar results.
Althoughwe study this problemon the double-star graph, we have checked that themicroscopicmechanisms
explained above are also applicable in bothwell-mixed and general structured populations.
To this end, we have explained the non-monotonic results shown inﬁgure 2.Herewewant to stress that the
impact of interactive diversity on the evolution of cooperation is less straightforward than that of other
diversities like topological diversity [29]. In case of topological diversity, individuals’ difference helps to establish
a sort of strategy homogeneity around hubs, where successful hubs spread strategies to their neighborhoods.
This strategy homogeneity is harmful to defector hubswhile it is beneﬁcial to cooperator hubs, leading to a
higher cooperation level around the highly-connected nodes and then the boomof cooperation in thewhole
population [35, 60]. However, interactive diversity enables successful individuals to enforce cooperation and
defection simultaneously to their neighbors, breaking the strategy homogeneity. Hence the largest cooperation
levelmay not accompany individuals withmany social ties, and the diverse systembehavior is observed.
Table 1.Theoretical frequencies of cooperation corresponding to evolu-
tionary processes in ﬁgure 5. fC
R ( fC
H) is the cooperation level in the traditional
setting (without ID) in the relaxed (harsh) situation. Similarly, fC
R
1 and fC
R
2
( fC
H
1 and fC
H
2) are the cooperation levels in ourmodel (with ID) in the relaxed
(harsh) situation.
Situations
fC (With-
out ID) fC (With ID)
Relaxed =f 1CR = -+ -fCR
M
M N1
2 1
1
= -+ -fCR
M
M N2
2
1
Harsh =f 0CH = -+ -fCH
M
M N1
2 1
1
= -+ -fCH
M
M N2
1
1
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4.Discussion and conclusions
Wehave investigated interactive diversity in bothwell-mixed and structured populations represented by various
networks, focusing speciﬁcally on the effect of individuals’ distinct responses against different neighbors on the
evolution of cooperation.Without invoking othermechanisms like recognizing each other frompast
interactions [61] or being informed howneighbors interact with the third party [55], individuals independently
update each of their strategies by imitatingwhat successful neighbors apply to them.
Weﬁnd that, in thewell-mixed population, with interactive diversity, cooperation emerges in awide
parameter range under threemost adopted gamemetaphors. In the structured populations, interactive diversity
drives the cooperation to a high level in PD and SH. The facilitative effects are also identiﬁed on networks
associatedwith high average degrees, which provides an instrumental clue on explaining how cooperation
thrives on highly connected social populations [16, 62, 63]. All of these have demonstrated that interactive
diversity beneﬁts cooperation.When interactive diversity is introduced in the scale-free network, cooperation is
elevated in the harsh situationwhile reduced in the relaxed case. Note that both interactive diversity and large
topological heterogeneity facilitate cooperation solely. The reduction implies that combiningmany promotive
factors togethermaymake the outcomeworse than thatwith each single one, verifying the conclusion in
previous studies [25].
We elaborate on the evolutionary process on a double-star graphwhich serves as the simplest abstraction of
heterogeneous networks, to explore the underlyingmechanisms leading to outcomes above.On the one hand,
interactive diversity helps to form stable cooperative clusters in the boundary of which individuals cooperate
with cooperators inside andmeanwhile defect to defectors outside. Comparedwith traditional cooperator
clusters [9], here individuals in the boundary can reduce the exploitation and resist the invasion of defectors in
harsh social dilemmas. On the other hand, interactive diversity enables individuals to imitate cooperative
behaviors in a fraction of interactions, which lowers the loss caused by the strategy turning fromdefection to
cooperation. Therefore, in the harsh social dilemma, dissemination of cooperation is still feasible. These two
togetherwell explain the promotive effects of interactive diversity on the emergence of cooperation.
Actually, thesemechanisms can be easily understood from the perspective of edge dynamics. Different from
the traditional dynamics where edges connecting to a speciﬁc node are closely related, here interactive diversity
considers the independence of edges linking to a focal node to some extent. In the network, cooperation
disseminates fromone edge to another rather than fromone node to another, which effectively reduces the
ﬂuctuation of relevant properties of the associated node. Put differently, interactive diversity facilitates the
permeation of edges ofmutual cooperation, indicating that how two individuals treat each othermay have a
more profound impact on the evolution of cooperation thanwhether they are cooperators or defectors.
As for the combination of topological heterogeneity and interactive diversity, the former one endows
individuals on hubswith chance to participate inmore games, and the latter one enable them to adopt
cooperation and defection simultaneously. Although these individuals behave defectively in some interactions
and incur losses, they still keep advantages over their neighbors. Consequently, defection survives under the
shelter of individuals on hubs.
Figure 6.The effects of interactive diversity (ID) on the evolution of cooperation are predicted analytically.Weplot the frequency of
cooperation fC as a function of r in the populations with (solid symbols) andwithout (open symbols) interactive diversity. The red lines
are plotted as a defector occupies the larger center initially ( = = =N M L60, 40, 10)with =*r 0.20. The blue lines are plotted as a
cooperator occupies the larger center initially ( = = =N M L40, 60, 10)with =*r 0.33. The value of r* at which fC decreases
sharply could be predicted analytically (arrows) by = -( )*r L N L . The initial strategy distribution is the same as that in ﬁgure 5.
Each point is averaged over 500 simulations.
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Aprevious work [52] has probed the effects of simultaneous adoption of cooperation and defection in a
square lattice and ring lattice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.However, previous conclusions are incomplete due to
the lack of further investigations in other structured populations. Here we systematically study these problems in
structured populations represented by various complex networks with three typical two-player games.Weﬁnd
the close relation between interactive diversity and edges, such as the connectivity stressing edges’number and
heterogeneity stressing degree distribution. Andwe understand the evolutionary dynamics on networks from
the point of edges.We have to point out that, when individuals aremodeled to behave differently, they need to
remember their strategies to each neighbor, whichmight be costly. The consideration of a cognition cost
assigned tomemorize the informationmay enrich thework and bring some interesting results [64–66].
Moreover, the combinationwith other factors, like individuals’ reputation [67] and the evaluation to the payoffs
[68, 69]may provide an efﬁcient response to different opponents’ strategies. Especially, with intention
recognition, individuals recognize opponents’s intentions on the basis of the previous interactions or in some
otherways, and thenmake decisions according to such recognized intentions [66, 70, 71], whichwell achieves
interactive diversity and is worth a further investigation. Interactive diversity, consisting of diverse interaction
types [72], constitutes realistic representations of the real world and should receivemore attention.
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AppendixA. Evolutionary dynamics on the double-star graphwithout interactive
diversity
In this part, we provide a theoretical analysis about the evolutionary dynamics on the double-star graph in the
traditional setting. The double-star graph is depicted in themain text, where the number of common leaves lc (L)
ismuch less than the connectivity of two centers (N M, ).We beginwith the assumption of >N M . Initially, a
defector occupies the left center h1 and a cooperator occupies the right center h2. Over leaves l1, lc, and l2,
defectors and cooperators are distributed equally. The evolutionary processes in relaxed and harsh situations are
studied and the details are provided below. For the convenience of description, we use h1 (h l l l, , , c2 1 2 ) to
represent the individual on h1 (h l l l, , , c2 1 2 ).
In the beginning (A1 ofﬁgure 5(a)), the payoffs (P) of h1 and h2 are given by
= + + + ( )P N r N1
2
1
2
, A.1h1
= - + + - ( )P M r M1
2
1
2
. A.2h2
The payoff of a cooperator (defector) l1 is = -P rl1 ( =P 0l1 ). >P Ph l1 1 and >P Ph h1 2 make it possible for Ds
(defective strategies) of h1 to spread to both l1 and h2. However, considering
- - - >  < -+ º( ) ( ) ( )P P P P r
M
M
r0
1
1
A.3h l h h 11 1 1 2
and the update rule withwhich each individual imitates successful neighbors with the probability proportional
to their payoff difference, Ds aremore likely to spread to l1 than to h2. A similar case happens to lc. Thismeans
that h1ʼs neighbors on leaveswill turn into defectors before h2, leading to the deterioration of h1ʼs neighborhood.
Meanwhile, h2 spreads Cs to its neighbors.
At this stage (A2 ofﬁgure 5(a)), both lc and h1 have payoffs + r1 . By
- = - = - + + - - >( ) ( ) ( )P P P P L r M L2 2 0 A.4h l h hc2 2 1
 < - -+ º ( )r
M L
L
r
2
2
, A.52
both h1 and lc reversely imitate h2. Comparedwith h1, lc has less neighbors to imitate. In otherwords, lcwill
imitate h2more frequently and turn into a cooperator before h1 (A3 of ﬁgure 5(a)). After that, h1 is also inevitably
invaded.Once it happens, the invader on h1 obtains = + - - -( )P L r N L1 1h1 . Given that defectors l1 get
= +P r1l1 , the invader can stabilize on h1 (A4 ofﬁgure 5(a))whenever
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- = - - +  - º( ) ( )* P P N L r L r
L
N L
r0 , A.6h l1 1
where r* is a critical cost-to-beneﬁt ratio. Since bothN andM aremuch larger than L, we get > *r r1 and > *r r2 ,
which demonstrates the existence of r*. For < *r r , >P Ph l1 1whereby Cs of h1 spread to l1 further (A5 of
ﬁgure 5(a)). If r is slightly above r*, due to <P Ph l1 1, Cs can never spread to l1, resulting in = + -+ -( )fC
M L
M N L
2 1
2
(A3
ofﬁgure 5(a)). Herewe stress that the common leaves lc play an important role in the evolutionary dynamics.
The traditional double-star graph exhibiting no loopsmakes the simple analytic treatments possible [35].
However, when it comes to PD rather than PGGs (Public GoodsGames), without themutual cooperationwith
commonneighboring cooperators, the cooperator can never stabilize on the left center, which actually can not
explain the boost of cooperation in heterogeneous networks [28, 29].
As r increases, the initial difference between h1ʼs and h2ʼs payoff
- = + + + - + ( )P P N M r N M2
2
2
2
A.7h h1 2
rises.Meanwhile, the value
- - - - - + -( ) ( ) ( )P P P P M r M1
2
1
2
A.8h l h h1 1 1 2
decreases, which indicates that Ds of h1may not spread to l1 before to h2. In particular, in the harsh situation, h2
is invaded initially and defectors dominate in the population (A1→A3 ofﬁgure 5(b)).
Appendix B. Evolutionary dynamics on the double-star graphwith interactive diversity
All settings are similar to those in appendix A except that individuals are allowed to behave differently against
different neighbors. Because various types of individuals is involved in the graph and their states are diverse, the
evolutionary dynamics is quite intricate. Herewe simplify the evolution scenarios and give twomost typical
processes separately in both relaxed and harsh situations. In each situation, the average cooperation level lies
between the theoretical values of these two processes.
Before our analysis, we give an intuitive understanding about how interactive diversity affects individuals’
evolution. p ( < <p0 1)denotes the probability that a cooperator h2 withMneighbors imitates a defector h1. h2
is assumed to have a larger payoff than all its neighbors except h1, suggesting that h2 can only change its strategy
by imitateing h1. In the traditional setting, h2 turns to a defector with probability p and remains unchangedwith
probability - p1 .With interactive diversity, in one generation, the probability for h2 turning into a defector is
pM (updatingM strategies successfully) and the probability for h2 to remain unchanged is -( )p1 M (failing to
update any strategy). The relations >p pM and - > -( ) ( )p p1 1 M indicate that such cases are less likely to
happen. Instead, h2 is likely to update its strategies inMp interactions in average.
Let usﬁrst discuss the evolution in the relaxed situation. The initial stages are similar to those in appendix A:
Ds of h1 spread to l l, c1 , and Cs of h2 spread to l2 (B2 inﬁgure 5(a)). Next, both lc and h1 imitate h2. Because of the
connectivity of lc, lc becomes a cooperator before h1.
Here we consider theﬁrst process: h1 imitates h2 successfully and adopts C against h2 (B31 inﬁgure 5(a)).
Besides, h1 is expected to adopt Cs to additional Lneighbors lc (the exact numbermay not be Lwhile it does not
affect our analysis) and n1 neighbors l1. The expected value of n1 is
= - - -+ <( ) ( ) ( )n N L
P P
N r
1
1 2
1, B.1h h1 2
2 1
where =P Mh2 and = + -P L rn1h 11 . The value of n1 suggests that n1 is small. The payoff of l1 associatedwith
those n1 interactions is = +P r1l1 .We easily get the payoff difference
- - + >( ) ( )P P L r n1 0. B.2h l 11 1
Sooner, h1 places Cs on n1 corresponding leaves, which increases h1ʼs payoff in return andmeanwhile enhances
h1ʼs advantage over leaves l1. Since the payoff of h1 is still lower than that of h2, h1 continues imitating h2 and
adopting Cs in some interactions. The cycle of imitation and spread of Cs gradually increases h1ʼs payoff until it
rises to or slightly exceeds h2ʼs payoff (B41 inﬁgure 5(a)). At this stage, the payoffs of h h,1 2 can be approximated
as = =P P Mh h1 2 . That is, h1 adopts Cs to L leaves lc, - -M L 1 leaves l1 and h1. The stable frequency of
cooperation is
= -+ - ( )f
M
M N
2 1
1
. B.3
C
R
1
The second process is similar except that h1 insists on defecting to h2 (B32 inﬁgure 5(a)). Once h1 gets the
highest payoff in its neighborhood (B42 inﬁgure 5(a)), it reversely turns h2 into a defector (B52 inﬁgure 5(a)).
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Actually, Ph1may exceed - -M r1 (themaximumpayoff of a cooperator h2) slightly. That is, h1 cooperates in
-M 2 interactions and defects to h2. The stable frequency of cooperation is
= -+ - ( )f
M
M N
2
1
. B.4
C
R
2
When r is a little above r*, in the traditional setting, = + -+ -( )fC
M L
M N L
2 1
2
is near fC
R
2 (bothN andM aremuch larger
than L). However, in ourmodel, the average fC lies between fC
R
1 and fC
R
2. Equivalently, the average fC is larger than
fC in the traditional setting. Therefore, r
* is also a critical value abovewhich interactive diversity providesmore
advantages for cooperation.
In the harsh situation, although the cooperator h2 ismore vulnerable to nearby defector h1, h2 just adopts Ds
in a few interactions. Assume that h2 adopts Ds in n2 interactions. Due to the rapid deterioration of h1ʼs
neighborhood, h1 will not be inﬂuential in h2. Two typical processes are considered. In theﬁrst one, h2 insists on
cooperatingwith h1 (B21 inﬁgure 5(b)). At this stage, = = +P P r1h lc1 and h2ʼs payoff satisﬁes
- - + + - >  < - - -+( )( ) ( )P P M L r n r
M L n
L
2 1 0
2
2
. B.5h h 2
2
2 1
In such a case, Cs spread to h1 from h2 and then to lc through h1. The subsequent process (B31→B41 in
ﬁgure 5(b)) is similar to theﬁrst process in the relaxed situation (B31→B41 inﬁgure 5(a)). The stable frequency
of cooperation is
= -+ - ( )f
M
M N
2 1
1
. B.6
C
H
1
The second process considers that h2 adopts D to h1 (B22 inﬁgure 5(b)). In such a case, h2 and its -M n2
neighbors form a stable cooperative cluster while Cs can never spread to h1. Since h2 adopts Ds against h1, n2 is 1
at least. Taking =n 12 , the stable frequency of cooperation is
= -+ - ( )f
M
M N
1
1
. B.7
C
H
2
Actually, n2 relies on the cost-to-beneﬁt ratio and the time length of the evolution. Both these values increase n2
and the actual cooperation level deviatesmuch from the theoretical value as r increases.
Furthermore, if a cooperator occupies the larger center initially ( >M N ), = -*r
L
N L
still exists and the
evolutionary dynamics remains nearly unchanged in the traditional case.With interactive diversity, in the
relaxed situation, since h1ʼs payoff never exceeds h2 ( >M N ), h1 imitates h2 until it precludes all Ds. Finally,
defection becomes extinct. In the harsh situation, cooperation is stillmore favorable comparedwith the case
without interactive diversity. Taken together, interactive diversity always supports the evolution of cooperation.
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